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Abstract: As economic incentives for biodiversity and ecosystem service protection (e.g., 
payments for ecosystem services) have become widespread in environmental science and 
policy, a major concern among conservationists and environmental scientists is that economic 
incentives may undermine people’s intrinsic motivations to conserve biodiversity. In this 
paper we review the theoretical insights and empirical findings on motivation crowding 
effects with economic instruments for biodiversity protection. First, we synthesize the 
psychological mechanisms behind motivation crowding effects relevant for environmental 
behavior as identified in the specialized literature. We then conduct a systematic review of the 
empirical evidence. Our results show that, although several empirical studies suggest the 
existence of crowding-out and crowding-in effects, evidence remains inconclusive due to i) 
methodological limitations for empirical studies to demonstrate crowding effects, ii) lack of 
adequate baseline information about pre-existing intrinsic motivations, iii) weak 
comparability of results across case studies resulting from  inconsistent terminology and 
methods, and iv) the complexity stemming from cultural and contextual heterogeneity. We 
conclude that, as economic instruments for conservation are increasingly implemented, it 
becomes paramount to develop robust methodologies for assessing pre-existing intrinsic 
motivations and changes in people’s motivational structures. To address possible detrimental 
long term effects for conservation outcomes we call for caution in situations where high 
uncertainties remain.  
Keywords: biodiversity, policy instruments, economic incentives, motivation crowding 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, economic incentives have gained increasing leverage in environmental 
policy as a means to promote biodiversity and ecosystem services protection1 (Vatn et al. 
2010; Pirard 2012; WBCSD 2011). While these developments are often regarded as an 
important impetus for biodiversity protection and an opportunity for “mainstreaming 
biodiversity” (TEEB 2012), critical voices raise doubts on their potential for halting 
biodiversity loss (McCauley 2006; Redford and Adams 2009; Child 2009). A frequently 
raised concern is the hypothesis that economic incentives may “crowd-out” intrinsic 
motivations, such as people’s moral commitment towards biodiversity protection (e.g., Luck 
et al. 2012, Muradian et al. 2013). Thus, the effectiveness of economic incentives for 
biodiversity protection remains contested, and some authors suggest that the changes they can 
induce in motivational structures could, in the long term, undermine conservation efforts 
(Kosoy and Corbera 2010; Vatn 2010; Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez, 2011). 
The crowding-out hypothesis is often traced back to Titmuss' (1970) argument that blood 
donors are typically motivated by moral concerns rather than money, and that monetary 
compensation for donating blood could hence decrease its supply (see also Mellström and 
Johannsson 2008). Motivation crowding theory is based on the psychological notions of 
intrinsic vs. extrinsic motivation (Deci 1971, Deci 1975, Deci et al. 1999). Intrinsic 
motivation refers to doing an activity for its inherent satisfaction, meaning that an individual 
is moved to act for the fun, challenge, or personal conviction entailed. Extrinsic motivation, 
on the other hand, pertains whenever an activity is done for its instrumental value or capacity 
of attaining some separable outcome in form of products, pressures, or rewards (Ryan and 
Deci’s 2000). Counter to a common assumption in economics, motivation crowding suggests 
that the effects of extrinsic motivators such as monetary incentives do not necessarily 
complement intrinsic motivations (Bowles 2008). Instead, they may undermine (“crowd-
out”), or, under different conditions, strengthen (“crowd-in”) intrinsic motivation.  
Frey (e.g., 1992, 1993, 1997) introduced the crowding-out hypothesis to the economic 
literature, arguing that these effects could under certain conditions even outweigh the 
stimulating effect of monetary incentives and reduce the propensity to engage in the desired 
activity. Since then, work in behavioral and experimental economics has discussed the 
crowding-out effect for a variety of contexts, including people’s motivation at the workplace 
                                                          
1 We treat “biodiversity” and “nature” as equivalent, and for the sake of brevity we write “biodiversity 
protection” instead of “biodiversity and ecosystem service protection”. 
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(Frey 1997, Gneezy and Rusticini 2000b, Heyman and Ariely 2004), communities’ 
willingness to host a nuclear energy facility (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997), parents’ effort  
to arrive on time for picking up their children from day care (Gneezy and Rusticini, 2000a), 
and voluntary effort to raise funding for humanitarian causes (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000b). 
Bowles & Polanía-Reyes (2012) report 50 experimental studies presenting motivation 
crowding effects across many domains. 
The relevance of the crowding-out hypothesis for environmental policy contexts has had 
frequent mention (e.g., Frey 1992, 1993, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997, Bowles 2008), 
typically with respect to behaviors such as resource use (recycling, saving water), modes of 
mobility (driving slow, use of public transport or bicycle vs. automobile), or consumption 
decisions, including boycotts of environmentally harmful products (Gawel 2000, Frey and 
Stutzer 2008). For corporate behavior, the hypothesis has been related to the inclination to 
pollute or prevent harm to the environment (Frey 1992, Gawel 2000). Recently, a growing 
number of studies address motivation crowding for economic incentives for biodiversity 
protection, such as for instance fines for over-use of forest products in Colombia (Cardenas et 
al 2000), a payment scheme for landowners planting trees in Uganda (Fisher 2012), or 
incentives for forest management and conservation in Mexico (García-Amado et al 2013). 
Yet, the motivational aspect of economic instruments such as Payments for Ecosystem 
Services (PES) remains “a very under-researched area” (Vatn, 2010, p. 1250). While 
economic instruments for conservation are increasingly implemented worldwide, our 
understanding of their long term effects on motivational structures remains elusive. 
Ultimately, understanding motivation crowding effects is of critical relevance for appraising 
the overall efficacy of economic instruments, also because motivational changes have 
sometimes been shown to be irreversible, at least in the shorter term (Gneezy and Rusticini, 
2000a). The aim of this paper is to advance our understanding on how far and under which 
conditions the use of economic instruments in environmental policy can lead to motivation 
crowding effects. We i) synthesize key findings in the economic literature regarding the 
psychological mechanisms through which external incentives can lead to motivation crowding 
effects, ii) categorize existing empirical research on motivation crowding with economic 
instruments for biodiversity protection, and iii) report and discuss the empirical evidence and 
associated implications for environmental policy and research. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the methodology used in the literature 
review. Section 3 reports our findings regarding the psychological mechanisms through which 
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motivation crowding effects are expected to operate and the empirical evidence of 
motivational changes with economic incentives for biodiversity and ecosystem services 
conservation. Section 4 discusses the findings and derives implications for environmental 
research and policy agendas. 
2. Methodology  
Our review was conducted in two stages. The first stage consists of a literature review of the 
economic literature on motivation crowding to synthesize possible psychological mechanisms 
behind motivation crowding effects. We focus on those mechanisms that were identified as 
relevant for environmental behavior, classifying them depending on whether they are 
expected to trigger crowding-out or crowding-in effects. The second stage consists of a 
systematic review of peer-reviewed articles searching for evidence of motivation crowding 
effects. Specifically, we review papers that are i) presenting an empirical study, ii) addressing 
economic instruments for biodiversity protection, and iii) testing for motivation crowding 
effects. We conducted a title search for articles at the ISI web of knowledge using the 
following combinations of keywords: ‘economic incentives and biodiversity’, ‘economic 
incentives and conservation’, ‘motivation, crowding, and biodiversity’, ‘motivation, 
crowding, and conservation’, ‘motivation, crowding, and environment’, and ‘motivation and 
crowding’, as well as a topic search for articles with the keywords ‘motivation, crowding, and 
biodiversity’, ‘motivation, crowding, and conservation’ and ‘motivation, crowding, and 
environment’. We then conducted an equivalent online search through Google scholar, using 
the keyword combinations as above. Last, we searched the reference lists of the previously 
identified studies for further relevant empirical work. 
The selected empirical studies are analyzed according to the following criteria: i) type of 
economic incentive, ii) targeted behavior, iii) target population, iv) geographical location, v) 
type of intrinsic motivation affected by the incentive, vi) methods and data, and vii) reported 
findings on motivation crowding effects. Economic incentives are divided into positive (e.g., 
rewards, subsidies, payments for ecosystem services) and negative types (e.g., fines, taxes). 
For targeted behaviors, the specific conservation practices are reported (e.g., propensity to 
refrain from logging or to engage in practices to protect biodiversity). Target populations are 
classified as urban, rural, or indigenous communities. Geographical location is specified by 
country and economic context (developed vs. developing country). Types of intrinsic 
motivations affected by the incentive are classified as pro-social motivations, defined here as 
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those that refer to social relations with other people or the larger community (e.g., altruism, 
reciprocity, social norms), and ii) pro-nature motivations, defined here as those that refer to 
values for, or relationships with, the non-human natural world (e.g., care-based ethics, 
intrinsic value of species). We only report motivations explicitly mentioned in the respective 
article. Following the taxonomy by Harrison and List (2004), empirical methods used to test 
for motivation crowding effects are divided into framed field experiments on social dilemmas, 
natural field experiments, and natural experiments. In framed field experiments on social 
dilemmas, local people are invited to participate in interactive tasks representing a situation 
where the environmental status of a common pool resource (CPR) or a public good (PG) is 
affected by individual decisions on resource extraction. In natural field experiments, a “real 
world” setting, such as the possibility to participate in a community activity or farmers’ 
choice between different agricultural practices, is manipulated by introducing an economic 
incentive, and people do not know that they are in an experiment. Natural experiments 
investigate effects of actual policy interventions involving economic incentives. Empirical 
data used to assess effectiveness of incentives and motivational crowding effects are classified 
as behavioral data, where behaviors are observed for making inference on status and changes 
in motivations, and survey data, where inferences on motivations are derived from reported 
attitudes, or statements on intentions to act. Finally, evidence on motivation crowding is 
divided into either crowding-out) or crowding-in effects. When applicable, we record the 
evidence for motivation crowding reported by the authors. Where authors do not explicitly 
refer to crowding effects, we check whether the presented analyses include implicit 
indications for or against the prevalence of motivation crowding effects. 
3. Results 
3.1 Psychological mechanisms underlying motivation crowding effects  
Table 1 categorizes and describes the different psychological mechanisms behind crowding-
out and crowding-in that were identified as most relevant for environmental behavior in the 
specialized literature. The table further includes examples from the environmental domain 
provided in the reference literature. We also indicate whether the psychological mechanisms 
are likely to be relevant for positive or negative incentives, or both.  
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Table 1. Mechanisms through which regulations and economic incentives erode or strengthen intrinsic motivations for environmental protection 
Effect Psychological 
mechanism 
Explanation Regulations for which this 
mechanism seems relevant  
References and examplesprovided 
Crowding-out Control aversion  Individuals with a sense of autonomy and self-determination 
dislike feeling controlled.  
All incentives. Bowles 2008, Frey and Stutzer 2008 
 Frustration  Individuals are frustrated when they perceive regulations as 
a signal of distrust that they will do the right thing.  
All incentives. Gawel 2001, Gneezy et al 2011 
 Reduce Image 
Motivation 
Others cannot distinguish if one undertakes a social activity 
voluntarily or by pressure. 
All incentives. Gneezy et al 2011 
Image concerns can be a motivation for recycling. 
 Frame-shifting An individual’s attention is shifted towards a focus on 
economic reasoning (short-term). 
All incentives. Bowles 2008 
 Release from moral 
responsibility 
Allowing monetary payments to compensate for 
environmental harm releases individuals from feelings of 
responsibility and guilt. 
Negative incentives. Frey 1992, Goodin 1994, Gawel 2001, Rodriguez-Sickert et al 2008, Spash 2010 
Tradable permits (e.g. for corporate CO2 emissions) to obtain the right to pollute or to 
damage ecosystems generate “prices” for environmental impacts. 
 Changes in values or 
mindsets 
The focus on economic reasoning affects attitudes and 
mindsets in the longer term. 
All incentives. Frey 1992, Vatn 2010, Gómez-Baggethun et al 2010, García-Amado 2013 
PES schemes change people’s conservation logic from moral obligation or community 
norms towards conservation for profit.  
Crowding-in Enhanced self-
esteem through 
social recognition 
Individuals perceive rewards as supporting and 
acknowledging their behavior. 
Positive incentives (in 
particular unexpected rewards) 
Frey and Jegen 2008 
Stewardship awards for communities are seen as acknowledgement of their traditional 
conservation activities (Hecken and Bastiaensen 2010). 
 Prescriptive effect Individuals receive a normative signal of what constitutes 
desirable societal action. 
All incentives. Frey 1992, Rodriguez-Sickert et al 2008, Bowles and Pólonia-Reyes 2012 
Implementation of a negligible fee reduces significantly the use of plastic bags 
(Rosenthal 2008). 
 Reducing pressure 
by forcing non-
moral individuals to 
compliance 
Intrinsically motivated individuals can more easily act upon 
their motivation when not facing the bad example or even 
“exploitation” of non-moral individuals. 
All incentives. Gawel 2001 
A fine in a common pool resource situation prevents that conditional cooperators with 
intrinsic motivation also overuse the resource when observing that others do so 
(Rodriguez-Sickert et al 2008, Narloch 2012). 
It is easier for environment-minded car drivers not to “speed” on the highway when a 
general speed-limit and fine prevents others from passing them (Gawel 2001). 
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3.1.1 Crowding-out effects 
We identified six psychological mechanisms underlying  crowding-out effects for 
environmental behavior, mainly from articles presenting general reviews on crowding-out 
effects across domains (Gawel 2001, Frey and Jegen 2001, Frey and Stutzer 2008, Bowles 
2008, Gneezy et al 2011, Bowles and Polanía-Reyes 2012). The first mechanism - control 
aversion - refers to the observation that many people dislike feeling controlled by economic 
regulation as they feel such controls impinge upon their sense of autonomy and self-
determination (Deci and Ryan 1985, Bowles2008, Frey and Stutzer 2008). Second, people can 
feel frustration when they perceive regulations as a signal of distrust from above that they will 
do the right thing (Gawel 2001, Falk and Kosfeld 2006, Gneezy et al 2011). Third, the 
introduction of economic incentives may reduce image motivation of people who engage in 
pro-environmentally behavior (e.g., recycle) because they are concerned about their social 
image (Benabou and Tirole 2006, Gneezy et al 2011). In the presence of incentives, others 
can no longer distinguish whether one undertakes an activity voluntarily or for economic 
reasons. Fourth, frame shifting occurs when an economic incentive changes the cognitive 
concept behind acting environmentally friendly (Bowles 2008). In line with Heyman and 
Ariely’s (2004) “tale of two markets”, an individual’s attention and decision frame is shifted 
towards a focus on economic reasoning, thereby reducing the influence of non-economic 
motivations. A related fifth category, release from moral responsibility, is relevant 
specifically for negative incentives based on the “polluter-pays principle”. Compensation 
payments can act as “environmental indulgencies” (Goodin 1994), where people believe to 
follow the “ethic of a market” (Frey 1992) and no longer feel the moral responsibility to 
refrain from doing harm (Gawel 2001, Frey and Stutzer 2008, Spash 2010). This mechanism 
has been related to corporate actors who can purchase permits to pollute or to impact 
ecosystems within market-based schemes, e.g., CO2 emissions trading or biodiversity offsets. 
Last, the focus on economic reasoning in specific decision contexts could in the longer term 
result in changes in values or mindsets for environmental protection (Frey 1992). This 
mechanism is reflected in concerns that PES schemes change people’s conservation logic 
from moral obligation or community norms towards conservation for profit (Vatn 2010, 
Gómez-Baggethun et al 2010, García-Amado 2013). 
3.1.2 Crowding-in effects 
Three psychological mechanisms for crowding-in were identified. First, intrinsic motivation 
can increase when positive incentives lead to enhanced self-esteem through social 
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recognition. For instance, stewardship awards for community conservation activities entail 
symbolic appreciation of people’s efforts (Hecken and Bastiaensen 2010). This effect may be 
stronger when rewards are not expected (Frey and Jegen 2008). Second, regulations can have 
a prescriptive effect by providing a normative signal of what constitutes desirable societal 
action (Bowles and Polanía-Reyes 2012). For instance, Frey (1992) argues that pro-
environment subsidies convey that ethical behavior towards nature is acknowledged by wider 
society. Rosenthal (2008) provides an empirical indication from Ireland, where a small tax on 
plastic grocery bags enacted in 2002 resulted in a 94 percent decline in their use within two 
weeks. According to the third mechanism - reducing pressure by forcing non-moral 
individuals to compliance - intrinsically motivated people find it easier to act upon this 
motivation when regulation prevents others from benefiting from non-moral behavior or even 
“free-ride” (Gawel 2001). For instance, an environment-minded car driver may find it easier 
to restrict her speed when others are not constantly passing her. Analogously, in a CPR or PG 
situation many people act as “conditional cooperators” who are intrinsically motivated but do 
not accept others to exploit their benevolent action (Rodriguez-Sickert et al 2008, Narloch 
2012). 
3.2. Empirical evidence of motivation crowding with economic incentives for biodiversity 
protection 
We identified sixteen articles that fulfilled all three criteria of our review. The table in 
Appendix 1 presents an overview of our analysis. 
3.2.1 Type of economic incentive measure and targeted behavior 
Eleven studies investigate the effects of positive incentives on biodiversity protection. In four 
cases the interventions are simply formulated as rewards, usually for limiting exploitation of 
natural resources. Seven studies explicitly refer to PES schemes that incentivize land use or 
other activities to support conservation efforts, e.g., forest management, tree-planting, or 
silvo-pastoral activities. Nine studies test negative incentives (disincentives) implemented to 
discourage environmentally harmful behavior, of which seven refer to fines or sanctions and 
two refer to taxes. 
3.2.2 Target population and geographical location 
No studies address urban communities. Although several studies refer to their populations as 
“traditional”, none clearly indicates that the intervention targeted indigenous people. Hence, 
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all studies were classified as rural communities. With the exception of one study conducted 
among Australian cattle farmers, target actors in all studies were conducted in developing 
countries. Six studies were conducted among communities in Africa (Uganda, Namibia, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Madagascar, Ethiopia), two in Central America (Mexico, Nicaragua), three 
in South America (Peru, Bolivia, Colombia), and one in Asia (Cambodia). The geographical 
locations of the studies are illustrated in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. Geographical location of empirical studies 
 
3.2.3 Type of intrinsic motivation affected by the incentive 
Fourteen studies refer to pro-social motivations, mentioning social norms (8), reciprocity (4), 
altruism (2), social image/shame (2), guilt (2), reputation (1), trust (1), and public spiritedness 
(1). Eight studies refer to pro-nature motivations, mentioning notions such as attitudes toward 
conservation (3), existence values (2), stewardship (1), care-based ethics (1), aesthetics (1), or 
respect for nature and wild animals (1). 
3.2.4 Methods and data 
Nine studies employ framed field experiments on social dilemmas with participants from 
local communities. Extraction or contributions of tokens in the experimental tasks are verbally 
framed as decisions in a locally relevant setting where natural resource extraction has 
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implications for biodiversity protection (e.g., hours spent collecting firewood, number of 
sheep to graze, number of bee hives harvested, quantity of extracted fish, number of planted 
trees). All nine studies analyze behavioral data from the experiments (i.e., extraction or 
contribution level); only one study complements with survey data. Two studies use natural 
field experiments, where economic incentives are introduced into a real setting explicitly for 
the purpose of experimental testing, and both combine behavioral and survey data. Four 
studies rely on natural experiments, all of them looking explicitly at motivational changes 
through PES schemes and exclusively using survey data. One social survey study was not 
classified. 
3.3. Reported findings on motivation crowding effects 
3.3.1. Evidence on motivation crowding-out 
Ten studies report crowding-out effects, but only three of them present statistically significant 
results. One of the studies that obtain statistically significant effects stems from a series of 
CPR experiments with introduction of weakly enforced fines.2 In a study conducted among 
rural communities in Colombia, Cardenas et al. (2000) find that resource extraction initially 
decreases when the fine is introduced, but that the effect subsequently wears off and returns to 
pre-intervention level. Measured in terms of deviations from Nash best-responses, extraction 
in the last rounds is above pre-intervention level. Vollan (2008) presents a similar effect 
among small-scale life-stock farmers in traditional communities in Namibia, though only with 
one specific group of the study population, characterized by low support for the intervention 
and high trust among group members. Here, extraction rates in the last three rounds are 
slightly above average extraction in the baseline condition, but this “over-shooting” is not 
statistically significant. Overall, CPR experiments introducing fines lead to mixed results. 
Reichhuber et al. (2009) observe a dynamic consistent with the two studies above, but have no 
data on baseline condition for comparison. In contrast, among communities studied in 
Cardenas (2004), Rodriguez-Sickert et al. (2008), as well as among the remaining population 
studied by Vollan (2008), weakly enforced fines reduce extraction rates for the entire duration 
of the regulatory intervention. The remaining two statistically significant effects stem from 
survey data investigating the introduction of positive incentives. In a stated choice experiment 
in Tanzania, Kerr et al. (2012) find that with low monetary rewards fewer people state they 
would participate in a collective activity compared to a baseline where no monetary rewards 
                                                          
2 “Weak enforcement” means that fines or detection rates are low, so that it remains economically rational not to 
cooperate. 
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are offered, whereas high payments lead to an increase in the stated participation rate. In a 
survey conducted among people in a Mexican Biosphere Reserve where PES schemes had 
been introduced in some communities and not in others, García-Amado et al. (2013) find that 
the longer PES schemes have been established, the more people state economic reasons to 
explain their willingness to conserve nature, indicating a shift from reasons reflecting intrinsic 
motivations to reasons reflecting utilitarian and monetary motivations. 
Six more studies present suggestive empirical evidence for crowding-out effects, usually 
based on qualitative data from interview responses, or data with weak statistical significance.  
In a CPR experiment among rural villagers in Cambodia, Travers et al. (2011) find rewards to 
be more effective when self-organized by resource users, providing indirect indication that 
crowding-out effects can be expected when external regulation replaces a well-functioning 
internally organized mechanism. In contrast, Narloch et al. (2012) conclude from a PG 
experiment with farmer in Bolivia and Peru that collective rewards seem to spur free-riding 
behavior, thereby undermining collective action. In a field experiment among community 
members in Tanzania, Kerr et al. (2012) find that participants who were paid for planting trees 
in a school yard state less work satisfaction than those who participated for free. This did not 
lead to differences in work effort, but authors speculate that people with less work satisfaction 
may be less likely to participate in communal activities in the future. In a study conducted 
among rural farmers in Nicaragua, Van Hecken  and Bastiaensen (2010) find “worrying 
indications” (p.438) that after the introduction of a PES scheme farmers are demanding 
compensation also for areas which they had previously conserved for free. From an interview-
based study among forest-adjacent communities in Uganda, Fisher (2012) suggests that a PES 
scheme for tree planting may lead to conservation activities below the initial level once the 
PES scheme has ended. The survey conducted by Greiner and Gregg (2011) indicates that 
Australian farmers have multiple motivations for conservation, including intrinsic ones, and 
that different motivations correlate with perception of barriers and preferences for policies. 
3.3.2 Evidence on motivation crowding-in 
Four papers report empirical findings indicating crowding-in effects. Rodriguez-Sickert et al. 
(2008) present the only statistically significant result. In a CPR game investigating over-
fishing among rural communities in Colombia, participants play ten initial rounds without an 
economic intervention, and are then asked whether they want a weakly enforced fine to 
become effective. Since participants vote against it, the fine is not imposed, yet the mere 
suggestion reduces extraction rates for several experimental rounds. Two other studies report 
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qualitative data from interview responses suggestive of crowding-in effects. Based on 
interviews with farmers and NGO staff in Madagascar, Van Hecken and Bastiaensen (2010) 
report that PES act as a symbolic factor by signaling that biodiversity protection is valued 
from the outside. Sommerville et al. (2010) report that payments for conservation efforts 
awarded at the annual fund party of the NGO-led PES scheme had a strong positive effect on 
peoples’ general attitude toward conservation. Last, authors of two CPR studies provide 
evidence that by forcing non-moral individuals to compliance, the intervention makes it easier 
for intrinsically motivated “conditional cooperators” to act upon their motivation. Again 
Rodriguez-Sickert et al. (2008) report for the context of over-fishing that a “low fine stabilizes 
cooperation by preventing a spiral of negative reciprocation” (p.223). Narloch et al. (2012) 
mention the same effect for rewards to promote agro-biodiversity through crop-rotation 
schemes. 
4. Discussion 
4.1. Growing evidence of motivational crowding effects 
The most important finding from our review is that several empirical studies suggest the 
existence of motivation crowding effects with economic incentives for biodiversity protection, 
supporting the hypothesis that economic instruments can have important impacts on relevant 
motivations and conservation logics. Studies indicating crowding-out effects outweigh studies 
indicating crowding-in effects, both regarding the absolute number of reported effects (10 
versus 4) and the number of statistically significant effects (3 versus 1).3 It is also noteworthy, 
however, that many of the reviewed studies with the potential to demonstrate crowding-out 
effects did not find any - or at least could not provide statistically significant results. From our 
perspective, the most convincing results are that “small” positive incentives can lead to an 
overall adverse effect (Kerr et al. 2011), reinforcing Gneezy and Rusticini’s (2000b) 
recommendation to “pay enough or don’t pay at all”, and that PES schemes involving positive 
incentives for communities can shift people’s perceived reasons for conservation from those 
reflecting intrinsic motivations to reasons reflecting utilitarian and monetary motivations 
(Garcia et al 2013). Beyond that, the evidence remains inconclusive, in particular about the 
conditions under which incentives can undermine or reinforce intrinsic motivation. 
                                                          
3 This numerical difference shall not be over-emphasized, since more studies set out to demonstrate crowding-
out effects, and the variation in empirical methods and datasets do not permit comparison of robustness and 
strength between crowding-out and crowding-in effects. 
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A general implication of our results is the need to be aware, prior to any policy intervention, 
of any existing intrinsic motivations for protecting biodiversity and social norms among 
people who will be affected by a policy intervention. As stated by Van Hecken and 
Bastiaensen (2010), “if these are few, there is not much to destroy in terms of ‘social markets’ 
and ‘intrinsic motivation’ (p.439)”, and indeed, the practical relevance of motivation 
crowding effects for environmental policy has been questioned on the grounds that people’s 
level of intrinsic motivations may often be negligible (Stern 2008, Gawel 2000, 2001). Where 
intrinsic motivations and norms are strong, on the other hand, economic arguments and 
instruments should be handled with care. Hence, there is a need to assess baseline information 
before any economic incentives are implemented, as well as for monitoring purposes. In 
addition, survey-based or experimental pre-tests can be useful for a better understanding of 
the effectiveness of policy interventions, including possible interactions between economic 
incentives and intrinsic motivation. As emphasized by Bowles and Polanía-Reyes (2012, 
p.416), “crowding out does not follow from the use of incentives per se but rather from the 
meaning that the incentives convey to the participants”. This meaning needs to be assessed for 
the particular context and relevant population. To our knowledge, such assessments or pre-
tests are rarely conducted as an integral part in the design of PES and other economic policy 
instruments. 
4.2 Large uncertainties remain due to lack of data and methodological limitations 
Despite of the growing amount of research suggesting motivation crowding effects with 
economic instruments for biodiversity conservation,  empirical evidence remains limited and 
fraught with uncertainty, mainly due to i) lack of adequate baseline information about pre-
existing intrinsic motivations, ii) weak comparability of results across case studies resulting 
from  inconsistent terminology and methods , and iii) the complexity stemming from cultural 
and contextual heterogeneity of crowding effects. 
The first limitation relates to the fact that the baseline of potentially relevant intrinsic 
motivations prior to the implementation of economic incentives is in most cases poorly 
understood or documented. A wide variety of intrinsic motivations for the protection or 
sustainable use of biodiversity is mentioned in the reviewed studies. In particular the 
motivations labeled as “pro-nature”, such as appreciation and respect for nature or 
stewardship ethics, are specific to this context and have not been examined in previous work 
on motivation crowding effects. Yet few empirical studies discuss the nature of the 
preexisting intrinsic motivations for biodiversity protection they are addressing. A majority of 
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studies use social dilemma games to investigate whether economic incentives erode “pro-
social motivations” (e.g., altruism, reciprocal obligations, social approval/peer pressure, or 
internalization of rules) expected to support norm compliance in social dilemma situations 
(cf., Fehr and Falk 2002, Frey and Stutzer 2008). As demonstrated by Ostrom (1990), social 
norms and conventions are indeed paramount for regulating the provision of local public 
goods and the sustainable use of natural resources in small societies. However, such norms do 
not necessarily rely on an intentional effort to protect biodiversity, and in such cases the 
experimental dilemma games are unlikely to capture pro-nature motivations (Smith and 
Wishney 2000). 
The second limitation relates to weak comparability across case studies, in part due to the 
absence of a consistent terminology and common classification categories (e.g. for intrinsic 
motivations or for psychological mechanisms inducing behavioral changes), remaining an 
obstacle for deriving robust conclusions. For instance, only four of the reviewed studies 
provide hints towards psychological mechanisms behind crowding effects. Travers et al. 
(2011) refer indirectly to “control aversion” by stating that rewards may be more effective 
when self-organized by the community. Rodriguez-Sickert et al’s (2008) refer to the guilt-
relief effect leading to crowding-out and to the “prescriptive effect” of policy measures as 
cause for crowding-in. Kerr et al (2012) explicitly and Garcia-Amado et al (2013) implicitly 
refer to a change of values or mindsets as explanations for crowding-out. 
Last, the geographical distribution of the reviewed studies illustrates that, while economic 
instruments such as PES and biodiversity offsets and markets are mainly theorized and 
promoted by actors from developed countries, communities in developing countries across the 
globe remain the playing field where the short and long term effects of such instruments of 
conservation policy are tested. These communities differ widely with respect to mindsets, 
values and social norms governing the use of natural resources and human-nature 
relationships. Hence, cross-cultural differences and the context-dependence of conservation 
behaviors and relevant motivation add to the complexity of the issue, and empirical results 
obtained in a specific context may be more difficult to generalize than for environmental 
behaviors commonly studied in the developed world, such as recycling, choice of transport 
modes, or ecological consumption decisions. 
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4.3. Improving research methodology for robust evidence on motivation crowding effects 
Despite recent progress in methodologies for testing motivation crowding effects, challenges 
remain for appropriate research design, assessing base line situations, and establishing sound 
methodologies to detect and monitor changes in motivations. As demonstrated by Harrison 
and List (2004), the characteristics and merits of different empirical approaches deserve 
considerable reflection. Fisher (2012) suggests that a “first best” design for testing motivation 
crowding would apply longitudinal studies, e.g., following a PES scheme over the entire 
duration, with reasonable control over causality of outcomes. However, longitudinal studies 
using “natural experiments” require long time periods before motivational changes and their 
behavioral implications can be observed. Another option are cross-sectional studies where 
different instruments are applied in comparable populations (see e.g., van Hecken and 
Bastiaensen 2010, and Garcia-Amado et al. 2013). Field experiments, on the other hand, 
provide the opportunity for targeted design and increased control over variables. Here, 
convincing inference from experimental data to “real world” behavior requires both a 
representative study population and that the experimental decision task is sufficiently similar 
to the relevant natural decision of interest (Hogarth 2005). Framed field experiments using 
Public Goods or Common Pool Resource games conducted with local communities are likely 
to meet the criterion of a representative study population, but it is not clear whether the 
experimental decision task (i.e., extraction of tokens in an abstract game with verbal framing) 
adequately triggers all motivations that drive biodiversity conservation behavior. Natural field 
experiments are conducted with a representative population directly in the relevant setting, but 
they tend to be more resource-intensive and complicated to conduct (including the permission 
and support for introducing a “real” conservation relevant policy), and it is more difficult to 
maintain experimental control of relevant variables (e.g., of people’s level of attention or the 
information they take into account for making decisions). 
Another challenge for empirical research is that motivation per se is not directly observable 
and has to be measured by appropriate proxies. Economists commonly measure behavioral 
data, and indeed behavioral data may be directly relevant for assessing the effectiveness of 
economic policies. However, observed behavior does not allow isolating different 
motivations, which creates difficulties for drawing conclusions on motivation crowding. For 
instance, when an incentive is introduced and behavior remains unchanged, this can imply 
either i) that there is a crowding-out effect where the positive effect on extrinsic motives and 
the negative effect on intrinsic motivation are canceling each other out, or ii) that both 
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intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are unaffected. The same holds for crowding-in effects. 
When incentives lead to net positive effect on conservation behavior, as e.g. the fines in 
Cardenas (2004), Vollan (2008), and Travers et al (2011), it is difficult to disentangle the 
influence of extrinsic motivation from additional intrinsic motivation. In order to draw 
conclusive inferences for crowding-out from behavioral data, empirical studies need to 
present a clear counter-effect, i.e., where the incentive reduces the propensity to engage in the 
conservation activity. Alternatively, studies can measure non-behavioral proxies for 
motivations. García-Amado et al. (2013) elicit the reasons people provide for biodiversity 
conservation and observe the frequency of occurrence of different reasons to shed light on 
people’s perceptions or mindsets. Psychological theory (e.g., Ajzen and Fishbein 1975) 
predicts that changes in perception affect the motivational basis and may ultimately result in 
behavioral change. Yet such correlations remain a controversial issue, as is the correlation 
between attitudes and behavior (Diekmann and Preisendörfer 1998). Nevertheless, 
psychological and anthropological work may offer further guidance for future work on non-
behavioral proxies. For instance, the potential of survey measures on non-anthropocentric 
motives for biodiversity protection (Spash 2000, Butler and Acott 2007, Spash et al 2009; 
Martín-López et al. 2008), psychological scales of environmental values and attitudes 
(Gagnon-Thomson and Barton 1994, de Groot and Steg 2008), and studies on people’s 
emotional connectedness with nature (e.g., Mayer & Frantz, 2004) has not yet been 
sufficiently exploited for research on motivation crowding effects. 
Last, empirical approaches should be able to separate the crowding hypothesis from 
alternative explanations for interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Consider 
the evidence that certain individual characteristics correlate with responsiveness to economic 
incentives. People with high civic values (cf., d’Adda 2011) or high intrinsic motives towards 
biodiversity protection (cf., Fisher 2012) have been shown to be less responsive to positive 
incentives. This could imply that their intrinsic motivation has been crowded out, but also that 
people with these particular characteristics simply care less about the monetary aspect. Or, 
consider the following alternative explanation for the erosion of the incentive effect after a 
weakly enforced fine is introduced (Cardenas et al 2000, Vollan 2008): the probabilistic 
information on expected gains and losses entailed in a “weakly enforced” fine is too complex 
for participants to calculate, so that participants first overrate the fine’s financial implication 
and realize only over time that enforcement of the fine is weak. Once they realize it, some 
participants return to non-cooperative behaviors and others (i.e., “conditional cooperators”) 
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follow, along the usual dynamics in experimental dilemma games (see e.g., Fehr and Gächter 
2000).  
5. Conclusions 
Motivation crowding is a well-established phenomenon and relevant in many contexts where 
intrinsic motivations play a role for determining behavior. For economic incentive measures 
meant to spur biodiversity protection, our literature review shows that the empirical research 
on motivation crowding effects is growing, and that a number of studies provide some 
evidence both for are crowding-out effects and for  crowding-in effects. Yet empirical 
evidence remains inconclusive, largely due to methodological and data limitations, including 
a lack of appropriate baseline information about existing intrinsic motivation against which 
motivational changes can be assessed, lack of common terminology and methodologies across 
studies, and complexities arising with variations across different environmental and socio-
cultural contexts. We conclude that it is worthwhile to undertake further efforts towards 
understanding motivation crowding effects by economic incentives for biodiversity and 
ecosystem services protection, and to widen the scope of empirical approaches. For 
conservation policy and management practitioners who are considering monetary incentive 
measures, it is recommendable to carefully assess existing intrinsic motivations and 
potentially adverse effects of proposed incentive measures. Given that crowding-out effects 
can have detrimental impacts in long-term conservation of biodiversity that can be difficult to 
reverse once they have occurred, we call for caution in cases where uncertainties remain, 
especially when pre-existing intrinsic motivations and biodiversity values at risk are high.  
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Appendix 1. Overview of empirical studies on crowding effects for the biodiversity context 
 Article Economic incentive measure 
and targeted behavior 
Target 
population and 
geographical 
location  
Type of 
intrinsic 
motivation 
mentioned 
Method and data Reported findings on motivation crowding effects 
 
1 Cardenas et al 
(2000) 
Government imposed quota 
with weakly enforced fines 
to limit the over-use of forest 
resources. 
Rural 
Colombian 
communities 
public 
spiritedness 
Framed field experiment: CPR game with local 
population, verbal framing of token extraction as “time to 
collect firewood in the forest” 
Behavioral data: amount of tokens extracted 
CO: Introducing sanctions initially reduces extraction levels, but 
subsequently extraction rises back to pre-intervention level. Authors 
argue that “the regulation appeared to crowd out other-regarding 
behavior (p.1719) and that “Looking at the earnings of this group 
apart from the rest provides a dramatic illustration of the welfare 
consequences of the crowding out effect of regulation.” (p.1730). 
2 Cardenas  
(2004) 
External regulations with 
random monitoring and high 
or low fine to limit over-use 
of forest resources. 
Rural 
Colombian 
communities 
altruism, 
fairness, 
reciprocity, 
reputation 
Framed field experiment : CPR game with local 
population; verbal framing 
Behavioral data: amount of tokens extracted 
All treatments (high fine, low fine, self-governance) significantly 
reduce extraction rates over the entire 10 periods. There is no 
evidence for crowding effects.. 
3 Rodruígez-
Sickert et al 
(2008) 
Authority imposes high or 
low fine for resource over-
use (fish or water). 
Additional setting where  
people can vote for or against 
the fine. 
Rural 
Colombian 
communities 
moral norms, 
guilt 
Framed field experiment: CPR game with local 
population, verbal framing. 
Behavioral data: amount of tokens extracted 
Authors state that “a guilt relief effect appears when norms are 
enforced” (p.227), but there is no support in the data. 
CI: The suggestion of a fine reduces extraction initially, but is not 
stable. Authors write that “When fines are rejected, internalization of 
a social norm explains the increased cooperation (p.215”). Authors 
also conclude that “Low fines stabilize cooperation by preventing a 
spiral of negative reciprocation” (p.215).  
4 Vollan (2008) Quota with external 
sanctions or rewards to 
limit over-use of collectively 
owned natural resources 
(over-grazing). 
Small-scale life-
stock farmers in 
traditional 
communities in 
South Africa 
and Namibia. 
culturally 
internalized 
social norms of 
trust and 
reciprocity. 
Framed field experiment : CPR game with local 
population, verbal framing of token extraction as “number 
of sheep to own” , “trust game” to study effect of trust on 
cooperation;  
Behavioral data: amount of tokens extracted 
CO: Author states that he “did not obtain the crowding-out effect for 
the complete sample.” (p.569), but that “there is a crowding-out 
effect in the penalty scenario occurring in groups where the penalty 
rule had been chosen with the lowest possible group support for the 
rule” (p.570),  concluding that “Penalty works significantly the best 
in the low trust region but crowds-out co-operation in a high trust 
area.” (p.571) 
5 Reichhuber et 
al (2009) 
Collective taxes and 
subsidies to discourage 
overharvesting NTFP (honey, 
firewood). 
Subsistence 
farmers in three 
villages with 
access to forests 
in Ethiopia. 
cooperative 
behavior 
Framed field experiment: CPR game with local 
population, verbal framing of extraction as “number of 
bee hives harvested”. Only collective behavior 
observable;  
Behavioral data: amount of tokens extracted 
Even under a low tax there is initially significant cooperation, but it 
wears off over time. Authors state that “cooperative behavior is 
crowded out by short-term individual payoff maximization” (p.653). 
However, since there is no baseline treatment without intervention 
for comparison, crowding-out cannot be analyzed. 
6 Van Hecken 
& 
PES rewarding  households 
for silvo-pastoral practices; 
Rural farmers in social norms, 
enjoyment and 
Natural field experiment: households subdivided into CO: No crowding effects in behavioral data., but “In a neighboring 
nature reserve, which plays a critical role in the local urban water 
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Bastiaensen 
(2010) 
in addition, effectiveness of 
technical assistance is tested. 
Nicaragua. satisfaction 
from the 
existence of 
natural 
resources 
three groups: PES, PES + technical assistance, Control 
Behavioral data: land use change to silvo-pastoral 
practice;  
Survey data: Interviews with participating farmers and 
project staff 
supply, farmers are at present strategically expressing this threat, 
allegedly demanding compensatory PES for protecting the remaining 
forests on their properties.” (p.438) 
CI: From interview data, authors state that “PES payments were an 
additional objective and symbolic factor” (p.441).  
7 Sommerville 
et al (2010) 
PES scheme to promote a 
forest management plan that 
forbids activities (agric. 
expansion, hunting) and 
restricts others through 
limited permits (timber and 
NTFP harvesting). 
Traditional 
forest using 
communities in 
Madagascar. 
attitudes 
towards 
conservation 
Natural experiment: Within PES scheme, (relatively 
small) payments to communities were awarded at annual 
party  
Survey data: Comparing self-reported frequencies of 
stopping harmful forest-use activities (in communities 
with and without PES); elicitation of attitudes towards 
conservation and of reasons for stopping activities 
CI: Payments have no significant direct effect on behavior, but 
survey data indicates that the annual Fund party and payment awards 
have strong effect on attitudes toward conservation, and they “create 
the positive attitudes and trust that lay the groundwork for voluntary 
local acceptance of monitoring, which ultimately acts as the 
motivational tool“. (p.1496) 
8 Travers et al 
(2011) 
Individual rewards (either 
from outside or within group) 
and weakly or strongly 
enforced penalties to stop 
over-use of resources (over-
fishing). 
Rural villagers 
in Cambodia. 
cooperation, 
reciprocity, 
norms 
Framed field experiment : CPR game with local 
population, verbal framing of extraction as “fishing from 
pond”;  
Behavioral data: Amount of tokens extracted 
CO: Regulations differ in effectiveness, but no direct indication of 
crowding effects. Possibly indirect indication since rewards are more 
effective when self-organized. 
9 García-
Amado et al 
(2011) 
PES schemes to promote 
forest conservation (no 
hunting and logging, 
surveillance patrolling). 
Agro-forestry 
farming 
community in a 
biosphere 
reserve in 
Mexico. 
Environmental 
awareness, 
appreciation of 
ecosystem 
services 
Natural experiment: Interviews eliciting whether people 
will continue conservation activities without PES, 
depending on allocation of PES income within 
community. 
Survey data: stated expectation to continue with 
conservation activities after PES 
No evidence for crowding effects in the data, authors state that it is 
“unclear whether PES can strengthen or work against intrinsic 
values” (p.2367).  
10 Greiner & 
Gregg (2011) 
A series of policy measures 
for on-farm conservation, 
e.g., income tax incentives, 
government regulation, cost-
sharing for conservation, 
management plans. 
 
Cattle farmers 
in northern 
Australia. 
stewardship 
goals, care-
based ethic 
Social survey eliciting motivational orientation towards 
conservation, perceived importance of impediments to 
conservation, perceived effectiveness of regulations and 
incentives for conservation. 
Survey data: economic, conservation, social motivations, 
incl. “look after the environment”, “pass on land in good 
condition”, “improve resource/land condition”, “live and 
work on a grazing property” 
CO: Authors speculate that “graziers, particularly those with high 
stewardship & lifestyle motivation, may have experienced the 
crowding out of intrinsic motivation by financially driven policy 
programs” (p.264), and “conclude that well-designed laws and public 
policies can harness self-interest in conservation, while incentives 
that primarily appeal to financial self-interest may fail when they 
undermine the fundamental values that lead farmers to act 
altruistically or in conservation-spirited ways (p.265)”. 
11 D’Adda 
(2011) 
Monetary punishment by 
community or public 
revelation of actions 
(reputational) as measures 
Villagers in 
rural 
communities in 
civic values, 
social norms, 
social image, 
conservation 
Framed field experiment: PG situation with individual 
contributions to a real reforestation project 
Behavioral data: Amount of contribution 
External incentives are more effective for individuals with low 
intrinsic motivation for norm compliance. The author writes that the 
results “suggest that motivation crowding occurs through the effect 
of external incentives on social image. Experimental results, though 
 25 
 
against deforestation and 
overexploitation of land. 
Bolivia. specific 
intrinsic 
motivation 
Survey data: individual environmental and civic values of limited statistical significance due to the small sample, are 
nonetheless valuable (p.2094). 
12 Fisher (2012) NGO-driven carbon PES 
scheme that pays land-owner 
during 10 years for planting 
trees on private land. 
Forest adjacent 
communities in 
Uganda. 
regulating 
services, 
aesthetic value, 
existence value, 
bequeath value 
Natural experiment: Interviews with 81 community 
members 
Survey data: motivations for tree planting, environmental 
values and future perspectives for conservation; benefit 
ranking exercise 
CO: Author states that “PES may be less temporally sustainable than 
more integrated interventions unless payments are maintained in 
perpetuity” (p. 53).  
Data indicates that several non-financial (including existence and 
bequeath) values of trees are present and that people with high non-
use values respond less to incentives. 
13 Narloch et al 
(2012) 
Individual or community 
rewards for agro-
biodiversity conservation 
(crop rotation). 
Farming 
communities in 
Bolivia 
(commercially 
oriented) and 
Peru 
(subsistence 
farming). 
norms, altruism, 
reciprocity 
Framed field experiment: PG game with local 
population, verbal framing of contributions as” land units 
allocated for planting a threatened crop variety”; 
elicitation of individual characteristics 
Behavioral data: amount of contributions 
CO: Authors conclude that “collective rewards could be ineffective 
and crowd-out social norms” (p.2096) and that “data from the 
Peruvian site indicate that collective rewards spur free-riding 
behavior, thereby undermining conditional cooperativeness and the 
potential for collective action”. (p. 2104) 
CI: Authors explain that “individual rewards seem to provide an 
additional incentive to unconditionally cooperative farmers, thus 
strengthening conservation by altruistic farmers” (p.2103). 
14 Kerr et al 
(2012) 
PES schemes with high or 
low monetary payments to 
individuals or groups 
(through village leaders), 
rewarding voluntary 
participation to manage a 
communal forest. 
Communities in 
Tanzania and 
Mexico. 
social norms Natural field experiments (and survey) with invitations 
to help collect litter from streets (Mexico) and plant trees 
in schoolyard (Tanzania). Stated choice experiment on 
participation slashing grass in schoolyard (Tanzania).  
Behavioral data: number of people showing up for 
collecting litter (Mexico); work effort for tree planting 
(Tanzania) 
Survey data: number of people stating they would show 
up for activity  (Tanzania choice experiment); stated work 
satisfaction (Tanzania field experiment) 
CO: Authors write that in the Tanzania choice experiment “a low 
payment yielded a lower positive response than no payment at all” 
and that the “field experiment yielded a similar finding, whereby 
subjects who were not offered individual payment overwhelmingly 
expressed satisfaction with the work and for having done something 
useful for the village, whereas most of those who received payment 
expressed dissatisfaction with the work and the task. This finding, 
though only suggestive, supports the motivation crowding-out effect 
of monetary rewards” (p.225) 
15 Lopez et al 
(2012) 
Public revelation, campaign, 
and high or low penalties for 
not keeping beaches and 
wharves clean. 
Fishermen on 
islands off the 
Caribbean coast 
of Colombia 
guilt, shame, 
social norms 
Framed field experiment: PG game with local 
population 
Behavioral data: amount of contributions 
The authors state that results “point to an interesting question for 
future work—does regulatory pressure complement or crowd-out 
social emotions in the management of natural resources? (p.141) 
16 García-
Amado et al 
(2013) 
PES schemes  with 
community payments for 
conservation activities and 
compensation of restrictions 
vs. Integrated Conservation 
and Development Projects 
Rural 
communities in 
a biosphere 
reserve in 
Mexico 
respect for 
nature, benefits 
from ecosystem 
services 
Natural experiment: 713 structured interviews in a 
project area where PES and ICDP were introduced; 
motivations are analyzed along type of program (PES, 
ICDP), years receiving PES, education, age, land tenure, 
conservation status of the community land. 
CO: Authors conclude that “PES recipients tend to show more 
appreciation for the utilitarian and monetary aspects of conservation 
than farmers involved in ICDP activities. Moreover, the longer the 
time having been receiving PES, the less likely it is that people will 
support an intrinsic, culturally based principle for conservation that 
gradually becomes replaced by monetary interests.” (p.99). The 
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(ICDP) (adaptive 
management, education, 
technical assistance)  
Survey data: Participant are asked to provide reasons 
justifying that “there will be conservation in the 
community in the future”. Reasons are clustered as 
reflecting “intrinsic”, “utilitarian”, or “monetary” 
motivation. 
authors further state that their data “supports the idea that PES are 
contributing to shifting from a “culture of conservation” to a “culture 
of monetary criteria” (p.98). 
 
CI = noteworthy results on crowding-in; CO = noteworthy results on crowding-out 
 
